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Abstract Lithium ion batteries have become established 
as an energy storage for electric vehicles. An essential 
component for optimal utilization of the stored charge is 
a cell balancing between the individual cells. There are 
several standard applications on the market now. In this 
paper it is shown by an example that a standard cell 
balancing circuit is compliant with the requirements of 
ISO 26262 with respect to random hardware failure. As 
an example the circuit is being evaluated whether it 
satisfies the requirements of the safety goal 
"overcharging shall be prevented" with respect to 
random hardware errors. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Electric mobility (e-mobility) is becoming 
increasingly important. For hybrid vehicles, electric 
mobility was introduced as a supplement to 
conventional internal combustion engine. Meanwhile, 
even pure electric cars are available on the market. In 
the year 2014 400 000 electric vehicles have been 
sold worldwide. The largest markets are USA, Japan 
and China. i  On the other hand, there is the lower 
range, shorter life time of the battery and greater 
demand of electronic control functions of the vehicle. 
The biggest challenge is the energy storage. So far, 
the lithium ion battery has prevailed in this area. To 
get the maximum charge stored in the batteries a 
function in a battery management system provides the 
cell balancing. With this, an attempt is made to 
compensate for manufacturing and life-related 
differences in charge of the individual cells of a 
battery. The use of lithium-ion batteries also means 
increased risks, e.g. by thermal effects. 
 
 
 
In 2011, the ISO 26262 for functional safety was 
published. The objective of this standard is to reduce 
the entire product life cycle risks due to malfunction 
of the electrical / electronics to a manageable level. 
 
II. BASICS ISO 26262ii 
A. Overview 
The ISO 26262 deals with the functional safety of 
electrical / electronic systems for production vehicles 
up to 3.5 tons. The standard covers all aspects of the 
entire product life cycle. The standard is based on an 
item definition whose functions are examined. An 
automotive safety integrity level (ASIL) rating A to D 
is assigned to the individual hazards. This ASIL 
classification takes into account the probability of 
exposure, severity and controllability in a hazard and 
risk analysis (part 3). The standard describes the 
methods required for system design (part 4), for 
hardware development (part 5) and software 
development (part 6) depending on the associated 
ASIL. The area of production, operation and 
decommissioning is described in part 7. The support 
processes such as requirement management, 
configuration management or change management 
are described in part 8. Part 9 deals with a safety 
analysis. Finally part 10 includes a guideline for the 
individual parts. 
 
Prior to intended evaluation the following activities 
are required. For the determination of the objectives 
to be achieved, the ASIL classification of the hazards 
and risk analysis (ISO 26262 part 3 clause 7) is to be 
determined. Especially for the hardware development 
the following sequence is indicated. From the Item 
definition (ISO 26262 part 3 clause 5) safety goals 
based on the ASIL classification are to be defined 
(ISO 26262 part 3 clause 7). From the safety goals a 
functional safety concept is to be developed. Based 
on this concept functional safety requirements are 
then derived (ISO 26262 part 4 clause 6), which 
provide the basis for the technical safety concept. 
 
B. Hardware requirements according ISO 26262 
part 5iii 
After these preparations, the requirements of ISO 
26262 part 5 can be addressed. This part deals with 
the "product development at hardware level". Starting 
from the safety plan (ISO 26262 part 4) a "planning 
of hardware-specific activities"iv becomes necessary. 
In clause 5 three main activities are enumerated.:  
- “the hardware implementation of the 
technical safety concept; 
- the analysis of potential hardware faults and 
their effects;  
- the coordination with software 
development.”v 
 
Based on a technical safety concept (ISO 26262 part 
4) hardware safety requirements are derived. Starting 
from there evidence must be found that the hardware 
safety requirements are complied with. This is carried 
out through metrics for the hardware architecture 
(clause 8) and on the estimation, whether random 
hardware faults lead to a safety hazard. Two methods 
are described for the safety hazard: first, whether in 
the part 3 specified safety goals are achieved or, as 
described in the standard as objective, "the residual 
risk of a safety goal violation, due to random 
hardware failures of the item, is sufficient low". The 
first method uses a rating based on failure rates 
metric, called "probabilistic metric for random 
hardware failures (PMHF)". The second method 
evaluates each single-point failure, residual failure 
and related dual point failures. Since the second 
method is the preferred methodvi it is also applied to 
the cell balancing circuit. For this purpose, proof is 
provided that a single fault does not exceed the 
thresholds of the standard. The residual risk of a 
failure is evaluated by considering "the occurrence of 
a fault and the efficiency of the safety mechanism". 
The occurrence is expressed with a failure rate class 
and the efficiency of safety mechanism is expressed 
by a diagnostic coverage. Dual point failures are 
evaluated similar to residual faults, with different 
limits. Part 5 closes with requirements on the 
hardware integration and testing. 
 
III. CELL BALANCING CONCEPT 
 
Cell balancing is a part of the battery management 
system (BMS) and provides an optimal charge 
distribution between the individual cells in order to 
save the maximum charge in the cells and also get a 
maximum back, since normal charging algorithms 
shut down as soon as a cell has reached the maximum 
charge. 
 
Figure 1.   Need for cell balancing 
 
The reason for the different charge levels of the 
individual cells can firstly be due to scattering of the 
manufacturing process, which is reflected in different 
internal resistances or capacitances. Also, different 
temperatures of the individual cells lead to a different 
behavior. The causes for different temperatures are 
determined inside the cell or by the thermal 
management of the entire package. In addition to the 
temperature, the State of Charge (SOC) imbalance, 
the total capacity or the impedance imbalance are the 
electrical reasons for the differences. The SOC 
imbalance can be compensated. The other two are 
generated by the construction of lithium ion cells and 
must be considered by the evaluation algorithm. vii 
 
The greatest risk in case of error behavior is the 
"thermal runaway" effect of lithium-ion batteries. 
Here, the lithium within the cell becomes unstable 
and there is a strong oxidation with excessive heat.viii 
This reaction can lead to additional hazards of fire, 
explosion or smoke. ix  Within lithium ion batteries, 
there is no overvoltage protection.x 
 
The causes that can lead to thermal instability are 
internal or external short circuit, overload, deep 
discharge or excessive heating.xi As a threshold 4.35V 
may not be exceeded during charging. Deep 
discharges should not fall below 2.7V to 2.2V.xii 
 
The reasons for cell balancing are the following:xiii 
- Increased safety by avoiding thermal overload 
(thermal runaway) due to overvoltage; 
- Extending the life-time; 
- Loss of capacity while loading; 
- Loss of capacity while unloading. 
 
There is a distinction between passive and active cell 
balancing. Passive cell balancing uses resistors to 
dissipate energy out of weak cells during loading to 
reach the desired load capacity for the whole battery. 
During unloading this concept cannot cope the 
limited capacity of weak cells.  
During loading the cell with a restricted capacity will 
reach at first the maximum threshold voltage. To 
prevent the shutdown of the charging process the 
Unused 
capacity 
 active balancing structure will transfer load to a cell 
with a higher capacity. While unloading the battery 
this structure can balance the other way to prevent the 
minimum voltage of the weak cell. As a basic 
principle the active balancing structure uses 
capacitances and inductances to transfer the energy 
from one cell to the next. This means much less 
energy is wasted as in passive cell balancing and a 
greater amount of usable battery capacity. 
 
The algorithm for cell balancing can have following 
approaches:xiv 
- Cell voltage based algorithm; 
- State of Charge based algorithm; 
- State of Charge and total capacity based 
algorithm. 
 
IV. COMPLIANCE OF RANDOM HARDWARE FAILURE 
FOR AN EXAMPLE CIRCUIT FOR CELL BALANCING 
ACCORDING ISO 26262 
 
Chipsets BQ20Z80 xv  by Texas Instruments was 
investigated as an example concerning the 
applicability of ISO 26262 part 5 clause 9 method 2 
in random hardware failure during cell balancing. 
 
For the hazard „overcharge causes thermal event“xvi  
the information of the paper „System Safety and ISO 
26262 compliance for automotive Lithium-Ion 
Batteries“ is usedxvii. The ASIL C classification arises 
at this point. The required 3 classes are explained by 
the aid of the Annex B of ISO 26262 part 3. 
- Severity – S3 – Life threatening 
injuries(survival uncertain), fatal injuries;  
- Probability of exposure in operational 
situation – E3 (“occurs once a month or 
more often for an average driver”); 
- Controllability is rated with C3 according to 
the definition that less than “90% of all 
drivers…, are usually able or barely able to 
avoid harm.” 
 
For the hazard of overcharging, the safety goal xviii 
„Battery overcharging shall be prevented“ is used. 
Based on the safety goal, inter alia, the functional 
safety requirements (FSR) "indication of overcharge 
shall be computed and communicated to the 
powertrain controller" and "if overcharge condition is 
detected, current shall be interrupted in x ms" are 
derived. As example of a cause of overcharging an 
over voltage is applied, that can lead to thermal 
runaway effect. 
For the implementation of the functional safety 
requirements in technical safety requirement (TSR)xix 
the two TSR “overcharge condition shall be detected 
within y ms” and “current to battery shall be 
interrupted within z ms” are used. These two 
functions of the corresponding hardware are then 
allocated in the circuit. 
 
To evaluate whether a violation has occurred, the 
safety goal method 2 of the ISO 26262 part 5, clause 
9 for the recommended circuit for the chipset 
BQ20Z80 and 4 lithium ion cells are used. xx 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  sample schematic for a cell balancing applicationxxi 
 
It is not scope of this paper to develop or describe the 
schematic. Therefore the reference schematic from 
Texas Instrument is used. For a detailed 
understanding of the function of the circuit please see  
the application bookxxii. The figure 2 is only added to 
get an understanding of the scope of the circuit and it 
is not intended to be readable. The core of the 
schematic is the gas gauge IC BQ20Z80, which 
computes the charge calculation and some safety 
function. As an analog front end (AFE) the BQ2931 
is used. As a second safety overvoltage protection the 
BQ2940 is used. The understanding of the schematic 
is necessary to assign the components to the 
functions.  
 
As an example for overvoltage detection the 
assessment for random hardware failures should be 
carried out for the safety goal "Battery overcharging 
shall be prevented". For this purpose, the method 2 of 
the standard is used. This method uses an individual 
assessment of the individual components and their 
errors. The method takes into account not only the 
error probability of occurrence but also the 
effectiveness of the safety mechanism. Exemplarily 
the BQ2940 and the cell voltage sensing of the 
BQ2931 are evaluated in this paper.  
 
The targets for the evaluation can be read in the 
standard in the corresponding charts. Depending on 
the type of error, the standard takes into account, both 
the ASIL level, as well as the failure rate class and the 
diagnostic coverage. 
 
The failure rate class reflects „the failure occurrence 
rate“xxiii The failure rate class 1 gets calculated from 
the corresponding target for ASIL D divided by 100. 
The following failure rate classes are times 10 from 
the previous failure rate class. In Table 1, the values 
for failure rate class targets are specified. 
 
TABLE I.  FAILURE RATE CLASSES ACCORDING ISO 26262 
PART 5xxiv 
 
Failure 
rate class 
Random 
hardware  
failure 
target 
Remark 
FRC 1 <10-10h-1 Target for ASIL D 
(<10-8h-1) divided by 
100 
FRC 2 <10-9h-1 Ten times the FRC 1 
value 
FRC 3 <10-8h-1 100 times the FRC 1 
value or the Target 
for ASIL D 
FRC i; i > 
3 
<<10-10+(i-1)h-
1 
10(i-1) times the FRC 1 
value 
Depending on the type of error, single point failure, 
residual failure or dual point failure other failure rate 
classes are defined as a target. For a single point 
failure of the ASIL C classification of the standard 
can be found in the FRC 1 or FRC2 with dedicated 
measures.xxv 
 
In the following table possible safety mechanism for 
overvoltage prevention are summarized. 
 
TABLE II.  IN THE FOLLOWING TABLE THE 
DIFFERENT SAFETY MECHANISM APPEAR. 
 
Safety mechanism 1 AFE – overcurrent
protection by turning 
Charge/Discharge FETs 
off 
Safety mechanism 2 AFE –instructed by Gas 
Gauge BQ20Z80 to AFE 
to turn Charge/Discharge 
FETS off 
Safety mechanism 3 Gas Gauge (BQ20Z80) 
indicate implausible FET 
or Watchdog of AFE and 
blows fuse 
Safety mechanism 4 2nd level overvoltage 
protection by BQ2940 
blow fuse 
 
To find the default failure in time (FIT) values for 
each of the implementation the standard references in 
Section 8.4.3 to Industry standards such as „IEC/TR 
62380, IEC 61709, MIL HDBK 217 F notice 2, RIAC 
HDBK 217 Plus, UTE C80-811, NPRD 95, EN 
50129:2003, Annex C, IEC 62061:2005, Annex D, 
RIAC FMD97 and MIL HDBK 338”.xxvi. For carrying 
out the evaluation, the basis failure rate values of the 
MIL HDBK 217 xxvii   and the specifications of the 
supplier were used. The division of the failure mode 
was geared to the example in the ISO 26262 part 5 in 
Appendix E and the diagnostic coverage is assumed 
with 99%. The following table shows exemplarily the 
evaluation of the random hardware failure rate of the 
overvoltage protection of 2nd level protection and the 
series cell voltage sensing of the analog front end. 
The 2nd level overvoltage protection senses the 
voltage (R4, C4) and the BQ2940 decides by itself to 
blow the fuse, over the Diode D4 and the transistor 
Q4. The series cell voltage sensing is done by the 
AFE BQ2931 and the Resistor R13 and Capacitor C9. 
 TABLE III.   EVALUATION OF THE RANDOM FAILURE RATE ACCORDING ISO 26262 PART 5 CLAUSE 9 
 
 
Comparing the FIT rates in the residual or single 
point fault column with the valid fault rate class it 
can be seen that all values are lower than the target 
and the circuit meets the requirement of the safety 
goal. However, it only fulfills the requirement 
because the safety mechanisms grab. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
- ISO 26262 part 5 is a useful method to evaluate 
random hardware failures also in cell balancing 
circuits. 
- The hardware- design of this example is 
adequate to the ISO 26262 requirement, because 
it reaches the targets in part 5 (hardware). 
Without additional safety mechanism it would 
not reach the requirements. 
- The example of the cell balancing circuit shows 
that a “not very complex” function has to be 
well deliberated to fulfill the requirements of 
ISO 26262 
- To evaluate the circuit it is also necessary to 
understand the battery basics to define the safety 
goals 
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